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THE PROBLEM OF PURELY
PROCEDURAL PREEMPTION
PRESENTED BY THE FEDERAL
HEAR ACT
William L. Charron∗

ABSTRACT
The underlying purpose of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
of 2016 (the HEAR Act), which is to return Nazi-looted artwork to victims or
their families, is undeniably laudable. Restituting Nazi-looted artwork is and
has been a moral objective of this country since the conclusion of World War
II. It is equally clear that victims and their families can often face obstacles
to gathering evidence from the war that would demonstrate Nazi theft in court.
The HEAR Act strives to address these concerns by imposing a federal statute
of limitations over all state law causes of action that would enable restitution
of Nazi-stolen art.
Notwithstanding the important purposes that the HEAR Act aims to serve,
courts should hold that the HEAR act violates the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism because it purports to preempt state causes of action on
a purely procedural basis. The HEAR Act does not itself provide a federal
∗ The author is a partner and a litigator at Pryor Cashman LLP in New York City, where, among other
things, he co-chairs the firm’s art law practice group. He recently conceived the idea for and led a
working group to establish the newly launched Court of Arbitration for Art (CAfA), which is administered through the Netherlands Arbitration Institute (NAI) in conjunction with Authentication in Art
(AiA) based in The Hague. He is also a founding board member of the Professional Advisors to the
International Art Market (PAIAM) in New York. The author wishes to thank Joshua Weigensberg
and Giovanna Marchese, associates at his firm, for their researching assistance.
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cause of action or remedy and does not present a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. Rather, the HEAR Act purports merely to engraft a federal statute of limitations on all the various state law civil claims of general applicability that enable the restitution of alleged Nazi-stolen art (e.g., for replevin,
declaratory judgment, or conversion). The purely procedural preemption imposed by the HEAR Act would appear to be an unprecedented–and unconstitutional–interference with state rights.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the international art market has skyrocketed since the early-2000s, the
field of “art law” has grown with it.1 The world is “flat” and small—and the
art world is flatter and smaller still. 2 Art, like any movable chattel, can easily
be transported and easily concealed. 3
It is now well known that the Nazis plundered art from Jewish families
throughout World War II to an enormous extent. 4 As Nazi archives began to
open and become more accessible in the late-1990s, the extent of Nazi artlooting was revealed. 5 And as the art market became more active and public,
stolen or allegedly stolen works were brought to the market and discovered.6
Consequently, restitution claims by victims or their heirs and families have
grown substantially in the 2000s. 7
Oftentimes, however, World War II-era restitution claimants will
1. Christine Steiner and Bee-Seon Keum, Art Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 20 CHAP.
L. REV. 119, 119 (2017) (noting that art law has grown as a recognized area of the law); 2017 Summary
- The Art Market Enters a New Phase, ARTPRICE, https://www.artprice.com/artprice-reports/the-artmarket-in-2017/2017-summary-the-art-market-enters-a-new-phase (last visited June 9, 2017) (highlighting recent growth in the global art market).
2. Thomas L. Friedman, It’s a Flat World, After All, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/magazine/its-a-flat-world-after-all.html (describing how patterns of globalization have made the world “flat”).
3. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, Art Looted by the Nazis Could Be Hiding in Plain Sight on the Walls
of Europe’s Great Museums, WASH. POST (June 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/art-looted-by-the-nazis-could-be-hiding-in-plain-sight-on-the-walls-of-europes-great-museums/2014/06/14/f3a8843c-ef02-4ca0-b30e-88addd45d90f_story.html (“Since the discovery of a longhidden trove of masterworks in Germany last year, advocates have sought to shine a spotlight on looted
artworks hiding in plain sight.”).
4. Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2006) (“The Nazi confiscation of property was meticulously planned and carried out with ruthless efficiency on an unprecedented scale. . . . In this vein, the link between the looted art and the Holocaust cannot be overlooked:
eradicating an entire people and their cultural heritage went hand in hand.”).
5. Id. at 206 (“Two books published in the mid-1990s caused a stir with their detailed documentation of the Nazis’ systematic looting, providing a body of research to potential claimants.”).
6. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“In recent years, a number of the world's most prominent museums have discovered their collections
include art stolen during World War II.”).
7. See generally Pollock, supra note 4, at 206 (stating how in recent years, many pieces of Nazistolen art have been discovered and returned to the rightful owners).
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encounter time-based legal defenses (e.g., statutes of limitations) that bar their
claims. 8 Notwithstanding Nazi archives, many times these cases present situations where documents have been lost or destroyed and witnesses have
passed away. 9 This creates a serious evidentiary problem, particularly for
current, bona fide owners of allegedly stolen art who are disadvantaged in
rebutting assertions of prior Nazi theft.10 As a general principle, statutes of
limitations are enacted with these kinds of problems in mind; at a point, claims
simply become too stale to fairly prosecute or defend. 11
The art market itself is largely unregulated.12 In the United States, for
example, provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for the sales
of goods, as adopted by the individual states, generally and often crudely apply to transactions involving art.13 The U.C.C. establishes duties of diligence
and assigns risks of loss as between buyers and sellers.14 Other nations apply
their own sales laws and regulations.15
The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (the HEAR Act),

8. See Kelly Ann Falconer, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally Binding International Agreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 383, 408
(2000) (“[O]ften the greatest barrier to Holocaust plaintiffs’ claim of ownership is the statute of limitations.”).
9. Pollock, supra note 4, at 225–26 (explaining how claimants’ challenges include destroyed or
missing ownership records as well as the fact that they are elderly or heirs of original owners).
10. See id. at 226 (“Litigation presents serious drawbacks to the museum, dealer, or private collector who possesses the art as well. Courts may find themselves placed in the unenviable position of
allocating rights and burdens between an original owner and a good-faith purchaser.”).
11. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (“The theory
[of statutes of limitations] is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”).
12. Cf. Kenny Ackerman, Ark Market Regulation: Why It Is Badly Needed, THE ACKERMAN BLOG
(Nov. 8, 2017), http://ackermansfineart.com/art-market-regulation-badly-needed/ (explaining why art
industry regulation is needed to lower fraud).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Carroll, 937 F. Supp. 2d 390, 434–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying provisions
of the U.C.C. to determine an art dealer’s duty of heightened inquiry).
14. U.C.C. §§ 1-202, -302, -304 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (establishing duties
of good faith and diligence among sellers); U.C.C. §§ 2-509 to -510 (dividing risk of loss between
buyers and sellers depending on whether there is a breach).
15. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Artful Good Faith: An Essay on Law, Custom, and Intermediaries in Art Markets, 62 DUKE L.J. 607, 632–33 (2012) (comparing how various countries apply
their laws to determine whether a good-faith purchaser of stolen works acquires title).
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which was enacted in the final days of the Obama administration with bipartisan support, offers a nationwide statute of limitations for restitution claims
based upon allegations of Nazi looting specifically. 16 The purpose of the
HEAR Act is to reduce the number of claims that are dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds; the stated policy of the U.S. is to decide such claims on
the merits. 17
The HEAR Act does not, however, alter or amend any substantive state
law that would apply to resolve such claims. 18 The HEAR Act offers purely
procedural preemption of the states’ various and differing statutes of limitations, without offering any substantive law preemption and without creating
any substantive federal cause of action or form of relief. 19
As discussed in this article, the HEAR Act’s laudable purposes do not
outweigh its conflict with the Tenth Amendment and this country’s principles
of federalism. 20 The HEAR Act’s purely procedural preemption is an unconstitutional experimental doctrine. 21 If Congress wishes to regulate the particular field of World War II-era art restitution claims, it must do so substantively
as well as procedurally according to typical preemption doctrine. 22
Part II of this article discusses the background and justification of federal
preemption, followed by a discussion of the HEAR Act and its preemptive
quality. Part III discusses the current state of the law concerning whether
16. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5, 130
Stat. 1524,1526 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law or any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except as
otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any
artwork or other property that was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution may be
commenced not later than 6 years after the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant
of—(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a possessory interest of the
claimant in the artwork or other property.”).
17. Id. § 2(8) (expressing the preference of Congress that claims to recover Nazi-stolen art be
resolved on the merits and through alternative dispute resolution).
18. Id. § 5(f) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create a civil claim or cause of action
under Federal or State law.”).
19. See id. § 5 (imposing a national statute of limitations on civil claims).
20. See infra Part V (applying Tenth Amendment preemption doctrine in finding the HEAR Act
invalid).
21. See infra Section IV.B (explaining purely procedural preemption).
22. See infra Section IV.E (concluding that Congress must establish a substantive cause of action
so as to not constitutionally preempt state law claims in actions to recover Nazi-looted art).
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Congress may only procedurally preempt state laws without also enacting
substantive rights and causes of action. Part IV analyzes the problem of allowing Congress to engage in purely procedural preemption. Part V explains
that the HEAR Act should be held to be unconstitutional because it offers
purely procedural preemption. Part VI provides a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congress May Preempt State Laws to Establish Federal Substantive
Rights and Causes of Action
There is no question that Congress can preempt state laws with substantive federal causes of action pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI
of the Constitution. 23 The Supremacy Clause states: “This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 24
Under Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, it has long been established that
substantive state laws that conflict with substantive federal statutes “must
yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power.”25
Congress identifies and creates federal substantive rights under Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution.26 That section gives Congress the power to
make substantive policy determinations to regulate interstate commerce, to
“lay and collect Taxes,” and to “provide for the . . . general Welfare of the
United States”—among other specifically enumerated powers.27 The Supremacy Clause elevates Congress’s substantive policy choices on matters
within its purview above those of the states. 28

23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
24. Id.
25. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
26. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress).
27. Id.
28. E.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“The relative importance to the State of its own
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Federal preemption doctrine thus involves a conflict of laws analysis that
asks whether a state law “so interferes with and frustrates [a] substantive right
Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to the federal interest.”29
B. Congress May Establish Preemptive Federal Procedural Rules to
Implement and Vindicate Substantive Federal Rights
It is equally settled that Congress can mandate certain procedural rules to
implement substantive federal rights and causes of action that Congress has
created, and Congress may likewise preempt any conflicting state procedural
rules that could frustrate the federal right. 30 The question in such cases is
whether the procedural rule is “part and parcel of the remedy afforded” by the
federal cause of action itself. 31
For example, in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad, the Supreme Court considered whether federal or Ohio state law controlled the resolution of claims brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 32 The
Court found that where Congress had set a “federally declared standard” of
“federal rights” available to injured employees under the statute, “uniform application throughout the country [was] essential to effectuate its purposes.”33
This meant that the states could not “have the final say as to what defenses
law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for . . . . any state law, however
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must
yield.”); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“For the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing
policy in every state. . . . [A] state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the
United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having
called into play its lawful powers.’” (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 222 (1916))); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (“When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for
all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all.”).
29. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (applying federalism principles to § 1983 actions
brought in state courts).
30. E.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (“This federal right cannot be defeated
by the forms of local practice.”).
31. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (quoting Bailey v. Cent.
Vt. Ry. 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)).
32. Id. at 361; see 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–55 (2012).
33. 342 U.S. at 361.
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could and could not be properly interposed for suits under the Act.” 34
In addition, the Court in Dice held that the states could not “eliminate trial
by jury” of such claims because “‘[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence,’ and . . . is ‘part
and parcel of the remedy afforded . . . workers under the Employers’ Liability
Act.’”35 The Court found that “the right to trial by jury is too substantial a
part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere
‘local rule of procedure.’”36
Another instructive decision is Felder v. Casey. 37 In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether Wisconsin’s notice of claim procedure for
federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Wisconsin’s
state courts was preempted by the federal statute’s non-inclusion of such a
procedure. 38 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that “while Congress may
establish the procedural framework under which claims are heard in federal
courts, States retain the authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules
and procedures that govern actions in their own tribunals.”39 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.40
The Court in Felder found that the question presented was:
[E]ssentially one of pre-emption: is the application of the State’s notice of claim provision to § 1983 actions brought in state courts consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does the enforcement of such a requirement instead “stan[d] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress”?41

34. Id.; see also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 177 (2003) (“The implementation
of the Act is a matter of federal common law, and it is for the Court to develop and administer a fair
and workable rule of decision.”) (citations omitted).
35. Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bailey, 319 U.S. at 354).
36. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949)).
37. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
38. Id. at 137–38.
39. Id. at 137.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 138 (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971)).
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The Court explained that “[s]tates may not apply . . . an outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal rights in their courts” and
found that Wisconsin’s “notice-of-claim statute is more than a mere rule of
procedure . . . [because it] is a substantive condition on the right to sue . . . .”42
Thus, “Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute undermine[d] [a] ‘uniquely federal remedy’” by creating impediments to relief that Congress did not impose. 43 The Court held that:
[E]nforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions
brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the substantive
right Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must
yield to the federal interest.
....
. . . State courts simply are not free to vindicate the substantive
interests underlying a state rule of decision at the expense of the federal right.44
The import of Dice and Felder is that when Congress expresses the existence of substantive federal rights, Congress may also preempt state procedural
rules that stand in the way of those rights. 45
As discussed below, the HEAR Act expressly provides no substantive
federal cause of action or remedy. 46 The act does not purport to preempt all
state law claims for replevin, declaratory judgment, or conversion of allegedly
stolen Holocaust-era art with a new federal claim for relief. 47 Rather, the
42. Id. at 141, 152.
43. Id. at 141 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)). The Court in Mitchum used
the phrase “uniquely federal remedy” to describe how § 1983 allows citizens to bring claims against
states that infringe upon individual rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and federal
law. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239.
44. Id. at 151–52 (emphasis added).
45. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[A] perceived Tenth Amendment
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”).
46. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5(f), 130
Stat. 1524, 1527 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)).
47. See id. § 5(d) (“Subsection (a) shall apply to any civil claim or cause of action that is . . .
pending in any court on the date of enactment of this Act . . . .”). The Act itself purports to apply to
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HEAR Act embraces state law claims of general applicability for their substance while imposing a nationwide statute of limitations over such claims
when they are used in the particular context of Holocaust-era art. 48 The question is whether Congress can partially, and only procedurally, preempt state
laws in this manner.
C. The HEAR Act’s Relevant Text
The HEAR Act was enacted on December 16, 2016 as “[an act] [t]o provide the victims of Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair opportunity
to recover works of art confiscated or misappropriated by the Nazis.”49 The
first stated purpose of the HEAR Act is to “ensure that laws governing claims
to Nazi-confiscated art . . . further United States policy as set forth in” 50: (a)
the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (the
Washington Conference Principles), including the principle that “‘steps
should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution’ to claims
involving such art that has not been restituted if the owners or their heirs can
be identified”;51 (b) the 1998 Holocaust Victims Redress Act (HVRA), 52
which expressed the sense of Congress that “all governments should
undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and public property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in cases
where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of
Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the claimant is the rightful

state causes of action in general and does not enumerate any particular claims. Id. § 5.
48. See Press Release, Congressman Hadler, Goodlatte and Nadler Introduce Legislation to Help
Recover Art Confiscated During the Holocaust (Sept. 22, 2016), https://nadler.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-and-nadler-introduce-legislation-help-recover-art-confiscated-during (“By establishing a six-year federal statute of limitations for these claims, the bill will help facilitate the return of
Nazi-confiscated artwork to its rightful owners or heirs.”).
49. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act pmbl., cl. 1.
50. Id. § 3(1).
51. Id. § 2(3) (quoting U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art § 8 (1998), https://www.state.gov/p/eur
/rt/hlcst/270431.htm (last visited August 12, 2018)).
52. Holocaust Victims Redress Act (HVRA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998).
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owner;53
and (c) the 2009 Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related
Issues (the Terezin Declaration), issued by participants of the Holocaust Era
Assets Conference in Prague, Czech Republic, which
reaffirmed the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art and urged all participants “to ensure that their legal systems or alternative processes, while taking into account the different
legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Naziconfiscated and looted art, and to make certain that claims to recover
such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits
of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all parties.” 54
The Washington Conference Principles and the Terezin Declaration are
aspirational but legally “non-binding” documents. 55 In addition, the HVRA
includes a precatory “Sense of the Congress” provision but includes no “mandatory” language and no “enforceable law.” 56
The second stated purpose of the HEAR Act is “[t]o ensure that claims
to artwork and other property stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis are not
unfairly barred by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair
manner.”57 This purpose is premised on the finding that lawsuits to recover
alleged Nazi-looted art

53. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(4) (quoting Holocaust Victims Redress Act
§ 202).
54. Id. § 2(5) (quoting Terezin Declaration, Holocaust Era Assets Conference (June 30, 2009),
http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/files/20000021535d8ef1a36/TEREZIN_DECLARATION_FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
55. See Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 577 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Terezin Declaration is “legally non-binding”); U.S. Department of State, supra note 51 (stating that the
Washington Conference Principles are “non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues relating to
Nazi-confiscated art”).
56. Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 202; Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the “Sense of Congress” provision in section 202 of the HVRA is precatory and includes
no enforceable or mandatory language).
57. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 3(2).
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face significant procedural obstacles partly due to State statutes of
limitations, which typically bar claims within some limited number
of years from either the date of the loss or the date that the claim
should have been discovered . . . . The unique and horrific circumstances of World War II and the Holocaust make statutes of limitations especially burdensome to the victims and their heirs. Those
seeking recovery of Nazi-confiscated art must painstakingly piece together their cases from a fragmentary historical record ravaged by
persecution, war, and genocide. This costly process often cannot be
done within the time constraints imposed by existing law. 58
The HEAR Act does not recite any provision of Article I of the Constitution as its source of legislative power. 59 Instead, citing a 2010 Ninth Circuit
decision, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 60 the HEAR
Act finds that “[f]ederal legislation is needed because the only court that has
considered the question held that the Constitution prohibits States from making exceptions to their statutes of limitations to accommodate claims involving the recovery of Nazi-confiscated art.”61
1. Von Saher
Von Saher struck down a California statute that “create[d] a new cause of
action” to “recover Holocaust-era artwork from . . . any museum or gallery
that displays, exhibits, or sells any article of historical, interpretive, scientific,
or artistic significance.”62
The court found that the California statute was unconstitutional under the
doctrine of “foreign affairs field preemption” because it “establishe[d] a remedy for wartime injuries” and thereby “infringe[d] upon the federal government’s exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs, even though the law [did]

58. Id. § 2(6).
59. See id. §§ 1–5; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
60. 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010).
61. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act § 2(7).
62. 592 F.3d at 958, 966 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(a)–(b) (West 2018)).
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not conflict with a federal law or policy.” 63 Specifically, the court found that,
even though the California statute “purports to regulate property, an area traditionally left to the states, [the statute’s] real purpose is to provide relief to
Holocaust victims and their heirs.” 64 The court explained:
By opening its doors as a forum to all Holocaust victims and their
heirs to bring Holocaust claims in California against “any museum or
gallery” whether located in the state or not, California has expressed
its dissatisfaction with the federal government’s resolution (or lack
thereof) of restitution claims arising out of World War II. In so doing,
California can make “no serious claim to be addressing a traditional
state responsibility.”
....
. . . Here, the relevant question is whether the power to wage and
resolve war, including the power to legislate restitution and reparation claims, is one that has been exclusively reserved to the national
government by the Constitution. We conclude that it has.65
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Von Saher found that California could not establish a special remedial apparatus for Holocaust-era art claims. 66 The court
instead concluded that any such remedial apparatus–if any–must be established by the federal government under the doctrine of foreign affairs field

63. Id. at 963–64, 966.
64. Id. at 964.
65. Id. at 965, 967 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003)). Much
Nazi theft occurred in the 1930s and early 1940s before Congress had exercised its power under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 10 to “declare war” on Germany (which occurred on December 11, 1941). See
Anne Rothfeld, Nazi Looted Art: The Holocaust Records Preservation Project, 34 PROLOGUE MAG.
127 (2002), https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/nazi-looted-art-1.html
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018). It is an open question as to whether, and to what extent, Congress’s right
to regulate the “aftermath” of World War II is appurtenant to that substantive Article I power. Von
Saher, 592 F.3d at 963. Von Saher may not constitute compelling authority to dictate “foreign affairs
field preemption” by Congress in this particular area. Id. at 964.
66. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967; see § 2(7) (stating that the court in Von Saher held that the California law that made the exception to the statute of limitations for Nazi-looted art claims was unconstitutional).
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preemption. 67 The Von Saher court based its decision in this regard in large
part on the Supreme Court’s decision in American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi. 68
2. Garamendi
Garamendi concerned California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief
Act of 1999 (the HVIRA), which required any insurer doing business in the
state to disclose information in aid of another California statute that “made it
an unfair business practice for any insurer operating in the State to ‘fai[l] to
pay any valid claim from Holocaust survivors.’” 69 Insurance companies and
the federal government complained that the HVIRA undermined a negotiated
agreement between the U.S. and Germany, signed by the U.S. President and
the German Chancellor in 2000, for both countries to work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (the Commission).70
That Commission was formed to handle “negotiation[s] with European insurers to provide information about unpaid insurance policies issued to Holocaust
victims and settlement of claims brought under them.”71 The Court agreed
that the HVIRA was preempted by the President’s authority to conduct foreign
relations.72
The Court first found that the Constitution allocates “the foreign relations
power to the [n]ational [g]overnment” out of “concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations.”73 The Court next found no “question
generally that there is executive authority to decide what that policy should
be.” 74 The Court observed that:
67. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967–68 (“[T]he federal government has initiated discussions with other
countries, which will hopefully yield a comprehensive remedy for all Holocaust victims and their
heirs. No organization comparable to the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims has been established yet to resolve Holocaust-era art claims. This does not, however, justify
California’s intrusion into a field occupied exclusively by the federal government.”) (citation omitted).
68. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
69. Id. at 408–09 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 790.15(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2003)).
70. Id. at 405–07.
71. Id. at 407.
72. Id. at 427.
73. Id. at 413 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
74. Id. at 414.
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[R]esolving Holocaust-era insurance claims that may be held by residents of this country is a matter well within the Executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs. Since claims remaining in the aftermath
of hostilities may be “sources of friction” acting as an “impediment
to resumption of friendly relations” between the countries involved,
there is a “longstanding practice” of the national Executive to settle
them in discharging its responsibility to maintain the Nation’s relationships with other countries.75
Accordingly, the Court explained that “[t]he exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where, as here, there is
evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.” 76 In particular, the Court found that “HVIRA’s economic compulsion to make public
disclosure, of far more information about far more policies than [the Commission] rules require, employs ‘a different, state system of economic pressure,’
and in doing so undercuts the President’s diplomatic discretion and the choice
he has made exercising it.”77 The HVIRA therefore contravened the President’s ability to speak for the United States with a single voice in resolving
World War II-era claims. 78
The President thus has the power to set diplomatic objectives for the nation in foreign relations and to preempt state laws that may conflict with the
President’s substantive policy judgments.79 Garamendi also posited, in footnoted dictum, that “field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine” to invalidate a state law “[i]f a State were simply to take a position on a matter of
foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility . . . whether the National Government had acted and, if it had,

75. Id. at 420 (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225 (1942);
and then quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981))). In Dames & Moore, the
Court found that the President had the authority to suspend claims of U.S. nationals against Iran because of the longstanding precedent of negotiating settlements with foreign states. 453 U.S. at 654,
679, 686.
76. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421.
77. Id. at 423–24 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000)).
78. Id. at 424.
79. Id. at 427 (“The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has
consistently chosen kid gloves.”).
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without reference to the degree of any conflict . . . .” 80
3. The HEAR Act’s Preemptive Statute of Limitations
Garamendi and Von Saher support the proposition that the federal government (through the Executive and Legislative Branches) may substantively
preempt state laws dealing with Holocaust-era restitution claims under their
respective foreign affairs powers 81 Both decisions contemplate substantive
policy- and rule-making by those Branches. 82 Neither decision, however, constitutes express authority for Congress to purely procedurally preempt state
laws in the Holocaust-era context.83
Nevertheless, the HEAR Act describes the decision in Von Saher as holding that a California law that extended the statute of limitations for claims
involving Holocaust-era art “was an unconstitutional infringement of the Federal Government’s exclusive authority over foreign affairs, which includes the
resolution of war-related disputes.”84 The HEAR Act states that: “In light of
this precedent, the enactment of a Federal law is necessary to ensure that
claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated in accordance with the United
States policy as expressed in the Washington Conference Principles on NaziConfiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin Declaration.”85
Based on its stated purpose, the HEAR Act imposes a preemptive statute
of limitations for all existing civil claims or causes of action recognized by

80. Id. at 419 n.11.
81. See supra Sections II.C.1–2.
82. Id.
83. The HEAR Act takes no account of the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art (Von Saher II), 754 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014). See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)) (failing to mention Von Saher II). The court in Von Saher II held that a
claim for restitution asserted against a private party (not against a foreign government), under “a state
statute of general applicability” (such as for replevin) rather than under “Holocaust-specific legislation,” raises no foreign policy conflicts sufficient to trigger foreign affairs preemption. 754 F.3d at
719, 723.
84. § 2(7).
85. Id.
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the various states’ laws that enable the recovery of Holocaust-era art.86 The
HEAR Act specifically provides:
(a) . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law
or any defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except as
otherwise provided in this section, a civil claim or cause of action
against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property that was
lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution may be
commenced not later than 6 years after the actual discovery by the
claimant or the agent of the claimant of—
(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other property; and
(2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or other property. 87
The term “actual discovery” is defined to mean “knowledge,” where
“knowledge” is further defined to mean “actual knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient information with regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.” 88 The term “Nazi persecution”
is defined to mean “any persecution of a specific group of individuals based
on Nazi ideology by the Government of Germany, its allies or agents, members of the Nazi Party, or their agents or associates, during the covered period.” 89 The “covered period” is defined to mean “the period beginning on
January 1, 1933, and ending on December 31, 1945.” 90 The Act has a sunset
date of January 1, 2027. 91
The HEAR Act also provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed
to create a civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.”92 Thus,
the HEAR Act prescribes a six-year federal statute of limitations—triggered
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. § 5(a).
Id.
Id. §§ 4(1), 4(4).
Id. § 4(5).
Id. § 4(3).
Id. § 5(g).
Id. § 5(f).

37

[Vol. 2018: 19]

The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

upon a showing of actual knowledge by the claimant—over all state law civil
claims that seek recovery for the alleged loss of art due to Nazi persecution
and that are commenced before January 1, 2027. 93
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Whether Congress may bypass the enactment of a substantive federal
cause of action and may only partially preempt existing state causes of action
by changing their implementing procedural rules, is a question that the Supreme Court has yet to answer squarely. 94
The question pits the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution against the
Tenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, which manifests America’s concept
of federalism and provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” 95
A. The U.S. Justice Department’s Opinions in 1989
In 1989, the Office of Legal Counsel to the Department of Justice (the
Department) opined on Congress’s power to only procedurally preempt state
claims in a context similar to that presented by the HEAR Act. 96 Specifically,
the Department considered whether Congress could “simply attempt[] to prescribe directly the state court procedures to be followed in products liability
cases arising under state law,” 97 including setting the statute of limitations. 98

93. Id. § 5(a).
94. See Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2014) (Sykes, J., concurring) (“It’s an open question whether Congress has the power to prescribe procedural rules for statelaw claims in state court. The Supreme Court has twice noted the issue but declined to decide it.”);
see also Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 197 So. 3d 1105, 1107–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that Congress does not have unlimited power to regulate state practice and procedure).
95. U.S. CONST. amend X.
96. See Congressional Authority to Require State Courts to Use Certain Procedures in Product
Liability Cases, 13 Op. O.L.C. 372, 372–76 (1989) [hereinafter Congressional Authority].
97. Id. at 373.
98. See id. at 376 n.5; see also Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong.
§§ 106–07 (1998) (proposed successor bill that would have imposed national statute of limitations and
statue of repose in certain products liability actions brought under state laws); Uniform Product
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The Department began its analysis by observing:
[F]ederal law may properly govern certain procedural issues in state
court suits concerning federal causes of action where this is necessary
to secure the substantive federal right. . . .
. . . [I]f Congress enacts a substantive federal law of products liability, it may also establish rules of procedure, binding upon the
states, that are necessary to effectuate the rights granted under the
substantive law. 99
The Department next explained, however:
Different questions are presented where Congress does not enact a
substantive law of products liability to be applied by the states, but
simply attempts to prescribe directly the state court procedures to be
followed in products liability cases arising under state law. Such an
action raises potential constitutional questions under the Tenth
Amendment, since state court procedures in applying state law would
appear to be an area that is generally within a state’s exclusive control. 100
Finding that “[t]here are no cases directly on point” and that “current
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be said to be entirely settled,” the
Department nonetheless opined, on alternative grounds, that Congress may
elect only to procedurally preempt existing state laws according to three Supreme Court decisions: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 101 South Carolina v. Baker,102 and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi. 103

Liability Act of 1989, H.R. 1636, 101st Cong. § 9 (1989) (imposing a two-year statute of limitation
with respect to state product liability actions).
99. Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 373.
100. Id. at 373–74 (footnote omitted).
101. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
102. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
103. 456 U.S. 742 (1988); see Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 374–75.
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1. Garcia and Baker
Garcia was a 5-4 ruling—decided along ideological lines with the “conservatives” dissenting—that overruled prior Supreme Court precedent104 issued less than a decade earlier in National League of Cities v. Usery (another
5-4 decision determined along ideological lines), which had held that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from preempting state laws in “areas
of traditional governmental functions.” 105 Finding the “traditional governmental functions” test to be “unworkable,” 106 the Court in Garcia found instead that there are “built-in restraints that our system provides through state
participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures
that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.” 107
In Baker, the Court explained that, “Garcia holds that the [Tenth Amendment’s] limits [on Congress’s power] are structural, not substantive—i.e., that
States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the
national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity.” 108
The Department construed Garcia and Baker to hold that “the only apparent ground for raising a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional regulation of state activity is to show that there were ‘extraordinary defects in the
national political process’ that frustrated the normal procedural safeguards inherent in the federal system.” 109 The Department concluded that it was “difficult to imagine circumstances under which any state could successfully argue that the enactment of national legislation requiring the states to use certain
procedures in products liability cases had been adopted pursuant to a process
that left the state ‘politically isolated and powerless.’” 110

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530–31 (overturning the “traditional governmental function” analysis).
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976).
469 U.S. at 531, 546–47.
Id. at 556.
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 374 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 512).
Id. at 375. (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 512).
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2. F.E.R.C.
Relying on F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, the Department opined alternatively
in 1989 that “it is uncertain whether the proposed legislation [of federal procedural rules governing state law products liability claims] would have been
held to violate the Tenth Amendment even under pre-Garcia case law.”111
At issue in F.E.R.C. was the Tenth Amendment constitutionality of the
Federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). 112 Among
other things, PURPA directed state utility regulatory commissions to “‘consider’ the adoption and implementation of specific ‘rate design’ and regulatory standards” according to certain federally proposed approaches, and
granted a right to individuals to enforce that policy. 113 The Court characterized PURPA as “attempt[ing] to use state regulatory machinery to advance
federal goals.” 114 The Court found no Tenth Amendment violation because
PURPA:
[R]equire[d] only consideration of federal standards. . . . “[T]here
can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a regulatory program.”
Similarly here, Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least
insofar as private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA
should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the
States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that they
consider the suggested federal standards. While the condition here is
affirmative in nature—that is, it directs the States to entertain proposals—nothing in this Court’s cases suggests that the nature of the
condition makes it a constitutionally improper one. There is nothing
in PURPA “directly compelling” the States to enact a legislative

111. Id.
112. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982); see Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) of 1978, Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
113. F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 746–48, 769.
114. Id. at 759.
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program. 115
Under the same reasoning, the Court also found that PURPA could “require state commissions to follow certain notice and comment procedures
when acting on the proposed federal standards.” 116 The Court explained:
If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a preemptible field—and we hold today that it can—there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima
as that body goes about undertaking its tasks. The procedural requirements obviously do not compel the exercise of the State’s sovereign
powers, and do not purport to set standards to be followed in all areas
of the state commission’s endeavors. 117
The Department construed F.E.R.C. as “suggest[ing] that Congress may
choose the lesser course of allowing the states to continue to regulate this field
[of products liability rather than completely preempt the states], while conditioning their continued involvement on state use of certain federally prescribed procedures.” 118
B. The Justice Department’s Opinion in 1999
The Justice Department offered a contrary, albeit conclusory, opinion in
1999 during hearings over the then-proposed federal Act to Establish Certain
Procedures for Civil Actions Brought for Damages Relating to [Y2K Failures] 119 (the Y2K Act). 120
The Y2K Act arose from a concern by Congress that computers would

115. Id. at 764–65 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
116. Id. at 770.
117. Id. at 771.
118. Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 375–76.
119. Y2K Act, H.R. 775, 106th Cong. 1999; see Anthony J. Bellia, Federal Regulation of State
Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 953 (2010) (referring to then-proposed title of the Y2K Act).
120. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–17 (2012).
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mistakenly fail to process correct dates after December 31, 1999, which could
“unnecessarily disrupt interstate commerce.” 121 Among other things, the Y2K
Act prescribed a pre-litigation notice requirement with a remediation period,
as well as heightened pleading requirements, a heightened burden of proof,
and a direction for state courts to follow Federal Rule of Evidence 704 which
governs expert opinions. 122
The technological concerns underpinning the Y2K Act never came to fruition, and thus the Y2K Act is effectively a dead letter. 123 Nevertheless,
[d]uring deliberations on the proposed Y2K Act, both individual senators and the Department of Justice questioned its constitutionality.
Senator Patrick Leahy described the bill as “an arrogant dismissal of
the basic constitutional principle of federalism” and predicted that the
Supreme Court would “strike down this new law as unconstitutional.” Senator Fritz Hollings described the bill as doing away with
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Department of Justice
believed that there was “a serious risk that courts would view [the
Y2K Act’s] procedural instructions to State courts as constitutionally
impermissible intrusions on State governmental autonomy.”124
The Department’s 1999 opinion apparently was its last consideration of
the subject of purely procedural preemption. That opinion indicates that the
Department questioned Congress’s power to preempt state causes of action
with conflicting procedural rules only. 125 As discussed below, this author
agrees. 126

121. Bellia, supra note 119, at 953–55.
122. Id. at 954.
123. See Lily Rothman, Remember Y2K? Here’s How We Prepped for the Non-Disaster, TIME
(DEC. 31, 2014), http://time.com/3645828/y2k-look-back/ (“Of course, it wasn’t long before it became
clear that all the [Y2K] fears associated with the turn of the millennium were for naught.).
124. Id. at 954–55 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting 145 CONG. REC. S8020 (daily
ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy); then quoting 145 CONG. REC. S4411 (daily ed. Apr. 29,
1999) (statement of Sen. Hollings); and then quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-131, at 34 (1999)).
125. H.R. REP. NO. 106-131, at 34 (“We also question whether it is a wise matter of federal policy
to preempt the regulatory authority of state agencies.”).
126. See infra Part IV.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE PROBLEMS WITH PURELY PROCEDURAL PREEMPTION
Congress’s power under the Supremacy Clause should not be seen to support the ability to superimpose purely procedural federal rules over the procedural rules of existing substantive state law claims and rights. 127 Principles of
federalism under the Tenth Amendment should limit Congress’s Supremacy
Clause authority in this particular regard. 128
A. The Justice Department’s 1989 Opinions Are Not Compelling
1. Garcia and Baker No Longer Reflect Governing Tenth Amendment
Jurisprudence
As noted above, the rule that developed from Garcia and Baker, upon
which the Justice Department relied in forming its 1989 opinions, was accomplished over a number of separate dissenting opinions by a then-minority of
conservative Justices.129 Indeed, in Garcia, Justice Powell dissented and criticized the majority opinion as having “only a single passing reference to the
Tenth Amendment,” and as “reflect[ing] the Court’s unprecedented view that
Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State’s traditional
sovereign power, and to do so without judicial review of its action.” 130 Justice
O’Connor similarly dissented and expressed her view that:
[F]ederalism cannot be reduced to the weak “essence” distilled by the
majority today. There is more to federalism than the nature of the
constraints that can be imposed on the States in “the realm of
127. See infra Sections IV.A–E.
128. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Revisiting the Constitution: Restore Federalism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
1, 2013, 4:27 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/08/another-stab-at-the-us-constitution/revisiting-the-constitution-restore-federalism ([W]hile the 10th Amendment doesn’t tell us
what powers belong to the states, its message is clear: preserving federalism requires vigilant enforcement of limited and enumerated powers.”).
129. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 529 (1988) (noting that Justice O’Connor dissented); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (noting that the Court’s
holding was a 5-4 decision and that Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger
filed dissenting opinions).
130. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560, 575.
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authority left open to them by the Constitution.” The central issue of
federalism, of course, is whether any realm is left open to the States
by the Constitution—whether any area remains in which a State may
act free of federal interference. . . . If federalism so conceived and so
carefully cultivated by the Framers of our Constitution is to remain
meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Government’s compliance with its duty to
respect the legitimate interests of the States.131
In the 1990s, the conservative Justices reshaped Tenth Amendment law
by holding that Congress may not “commandeer” state lawmaking in two
leading decisions: New York v. United States (6-3 decision delivered by Justice O’Connor)132 and Printz v. United States (5-4 decision delivered by Justice Scalia).133
In New York, the Court invalidated a federal radioactive waste disposal
statute because Congress sought to “use the States as implements of regulation
. . . [by] direct[ing] or otherwise motivat[ing] the States to regulate in a particular field or a particular way.” 134 The Court explained that, “[i]f a power is
delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.”135 Thus, according
to the Court, while Congress has “the ability to encourage a State to regulate
in a particular way, or . . . [to] hold out incentives to the States as a method of
influencing a State’s policy choices,” Congress “may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” 136
While not purporting to overrule Garcia, the Court in New York nonetheless revived as a rule that “[t]he Tenth Amendment . . . directs us to determine
131. Id. at 580–81.
132. New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144, 147 (1992).
133. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900–01 (1997).
134. New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
135. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 161, 166 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
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. . . whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an
Article I power.”137 Therefore, inquiring into whether a “political process defect” led to an overbearing federal law no longer resolves the issue.138
The Supreme Court reinforced the “anti-commandeering principle” in
Printz by invalidating a provision of the Federal Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (the Brady Act) 139 that had “command[ed] state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers and to perform certain related tasks.” 140 In particular, the Court
rejected the Federal Government’s argument that the Brady Act was constitutionally permissible because it did “not require state legislative or executive
officials to make policy” but rather simply “requir[ed] state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress.” 141 In this sense, Printz
suggests that Congress may not simply command states, as a ministerial matter, to follow federal procedural mandates in the states’ implementation of
their own causes of action. 142
Accordingly, the Department’s reliance in 1989 on Garcia and Baker in
concluding that Congress may procedurally preempt state civil laws without
a substantive federal cause of action is stale. 143
2. The Department’s 1989 Opinion Misconstrued F.E.R.C.
The Department’s alternative reliance in 1989 on F.E.R.C. is also

137. Id. at 157.
138. See id. But see Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 374 (arguing that the only grounds
for raising a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional regulation of state activity is to show that
there were “extraordinary defects in the national political process” (quoting South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988))).
139. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
140. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
141. Id. at 926, 929.
142. See id. at 928 (“Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is
arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than . . . by ‘reduc[ing]
[them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.’” (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99, 97 (1977))); see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000) (explaining that “the federalism principles enunciated in New York . . . and Printz” control Tenth Amendment analyses).
143. See supra Section IV.A.1.

46

[Vol. 2018: 19]

The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

problematic because that decision does not hold that Congress may solely procedurally preempt state laws.144 The Court in F.E.R.C. made it painfully clear
that the federal statute’s imposition on the states was minimal because it required no more than a “consideration” of the federal standards proposed.145
Thus, PURPA did not necessarily present an outcome-determinative effect on
state action; indeed, PURPA did not necessarily “conflict” with any state laws
at all. 146 F.E.R.C. is thus questionable authority upon which to conclude that
Congress may superimpose conflicting and outcome-determinative procedural rules (such as shorter or lengthier statutes of limitation) on existing state
causes of action. 147
In addition, the statute in F.E.R.C. was not purely procedural. 148 Congress had made substantive determinations about its proposed rate-setting
mechanisms, thereby creating a substantive federal right that could be enforced (at least to the extent of requiring states to “consider” the proposed
federal standards).149 PURPA’s notice and comment procedures—which the
Court also emphasized were “minima”—did not exist in a vacuum of enacted
substantive federal rights.150 Rather, the Court found that those procedures
provided the means to ensure that the states demonstrated their “undertaking”
of actually “considering” the proposed federal standards. 151 F.E.R.C. is

144. See infra Section III.A.2.
145. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982) (“Titles I and II of PURPA require only
consideration of federal standards.”).
146. Id. at 765 (“[B]ecause the two challenged [PURPA] Titles simply condition continued state
involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals, they do not threaten the
States’ ‘separate and independent existence.’” (first quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76
(1869); and then quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911))); see also Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 367, 372 (2000) (“We will find preemption where it is impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal law.”).
147. Cf. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (refusing to answer whether statute
of limitations is a procedural or substantive, but holding that in diversity cases, courts should apply
the state procedural rules if the federal procedural rules would determine the case differently).
148. See F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 772 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“As these utilities normally are given
monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by state
law.”).
149. Id. at 746 (“PURPA direct[ed] state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities
to ‘consider’ the adoption and implementation of specific ‘rate design’ and regulatory standards.”).
150. Id. at 771.
151. Id. (“[T]here is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima
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accordingly akin to Dice and Felder in holding that Congress may impose
procedural rules that are “part and parcel” of the substantive federal right that
Congress wants enabled. 152
For these reasons, the Department’s opinion in 1989 that Congress may
elect to procedurally preempt state causes of action without coupling its procedural rules with substantive federal rights is not compelling. 153 Notably, the
products liability bills proposed by Congress in 1989 and again in 1998 were
never enacted.1 154 The HEAR Act appears to be Congress’s next effort to
procedurally preempt state causes of action. 155
B. Purely Procedural Preemption Offends Federalism
Federalism, grounded in the Tenth Amendment, “states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered.” 156 Article I grants Congress
the right to create substantive federal rights and causes of action within the
expressly enumerated subjects of Section Eight; 157 other substantive policy
and rulemaking are reserved to the states. 158
as that body goes about undertaking its tasks.”).
152. See Felder v. Casey 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (“[E]nforcement of the notice-of-claim statute
in § 1983 actions brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right Congress
created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to the federal interest.”); Dice v. Akron, Canton
& Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) ) (“The right to trial by jury is a ‘basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence’ and that it is ‘part and parcel of the remedy afforded
railroad workers under the [federal] Employers’ Liability Act.’” (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319
U.S. 350, 354 (1943))).
153. See supra Section III.A.
154. See Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong. §§ 106–07 (1998); Uniform
Product Liability Act of 1989, H.R. 1636, 101st Cong. § 9 (1989); see also H.R. 1636 (101st): Uniform
Product Liability Act of 1989, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/hr1636 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2018) (noting that the Uniform Product Liability Act of 1989 was not enacted); S. 2236
(105th): Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/105/s2236 (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (noting that the Product Liability Reform Act of
1998 was not enacted).
155. See infra Part V.
156. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
157. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
158. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“[A] state court
cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of
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Nothing in Article I expressly grants Congress the right to vary state rules
of procedure, and the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the setting of such
rules as falling within the sphere of state power. 159
The notion that Congress can command states to apply their causes of
action in a particular field according to federally preferred procedures based
on Congress’s power to preempt the field by substantive legislation, conflicts
with the principles of federalism and state sovereignty, and similarly, conflicts
with the rulings in New York and Printz.160
New York forbids Congress from directly compelling states “to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.” 161 By engrafting a federal procedure
onto state causes of action, Congress effectively compels the states (through
their legislatures and judiciaries) to transmogrify their own civil claims.162
The fact that Congress could have—but did not—completely preempt the
field with a substantive law of its own is a non sequitur response to this
point. 163
Likewise, Printz rejected the proposition that Congress can compel states
(through their officers, including state judges) to enforce “discrete” and
impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.’”
(quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916))); Mondou v. N.Y.,
New Haven, & Hartford. R.R. 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912) (“When Congress, in the exertion of the power
confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and
thereby established a policy for all.”).
159. E.g., Felder v. Casey 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (“No one disputes the general and unassailable
proposition . . . that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own
courts.”); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its courts
are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own
procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts.”); Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 219 (explaining that, while
the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury “must . . . be applicable to every right of a Federal
character created by Congress,” there is “no ground for the proposition that the Amendment is applicable and controlling in proceedings in state courts deriving their authority from state law”).
160. See generally Bellia, supra note 119, at 976–83.
161. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
162. See Bellia, supra note 119, at 959–63 (discussing Congress’s authority to force state courts to
follow procedural rules).
163. See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 227 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (“Stated differently, Congress ‘lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit’ acts which Congress itself may require or prohibit.” (quoting New
York, 505 U.S. at 166)).
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“ministerial” rules. 164 In fact, the language in Printz supports the conclusion
that the Court would be skeptical of a rule that would permit Congress to vary
procedural rules for state causes of action without the creation of a substantive
federal right and cause of action. 165
The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Felder that “State courts simply
are not free to vindicate the substantive interests underlying a state rule of
decision at the expense of the federal right” is also instructive.166 The corollary implication is that Congress may not be free to vindicate the substantive
interests underlying a particular federal rule of procedure at the expense of
state sovereignty to establish a state right. 167
164. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997). See also Bellia, supra note 119, at 973–76,
976 n.160 (citing the Judges Clause within the Supremacy Clause and explaining: “To say, as the
Court did in Printz, that federal law imposes mandatory obligations on judges in state courts is not to
say that Congress may act outside of its enumerated powers to order state judges to do anything”).
165. See also Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (“To sustain § 1367(d) in this
case, we need not (and do not) hold that Congress has unlimited power to regulate practice and procedure in state courts.”); Felder v. Casey 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (“[W]here state courts entertain a
federally created cause of action, the ‘federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.’”
(quoting Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949))); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its
courts.”); In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397, 407 (1871) (“Such being the distinct and independent character
of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude
with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary
on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other.”); cf. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“[Federal] [s]upervision over either the legislative or the judicial
action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically
authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted,
is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.”).
166. Felder, 487 U.S. at 152.
167. See Bellia, supra note 119, at 1001 (“[T]he states should have exclusive authority to regulate
state court procedures for enforcing rights of action arising under their own laws. . . . The power to
create rights of action should include the power to specify a fitting means of judicial enforcement.”).
Professor Bellia’s article posed the following question: “Suppose Congress passed a law providing
that, in cases affecting interstate commerce, even in cases arising under state law, state courts must
enforce the following rules: Rule 1—An answer or motion to dismiss must be filed within five days
after service of a complaint; Rule 2—Discovery must be completed within two weeks after service of
a complaint; . . . . The statute states that its purpose is to lessen the economic burden of protracted
litigation on interstate commerce. Would such a statute be constitutional?” Id. at 953. Professor
Bellia concluded that the answer to the question above should be “no.” Id. at 1001. His conclusion
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C. The Second Circuit’s 2002 Decision in Freier
Proponents of Congress’s power to purely procedurally preempt state
laws may point to the Second Circuit’s decision in Freier v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.168 As explained below, while that decision appears at first
glance to support Congress’s right to pass purely procedural laws, a closer
analysis, and the need to reconcile Freier’s holding with pre-existing (and still
controlling) Supreme Court precedent, indicates otherwise. 169
In Freier, the Second Circuit considered whether the claim-accrual provision of the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 170 which requires a plaintiff’s actual or constructive knowledge of toxic harm to commence the statute of
limitations period,171 could preempt conflicting state statute of limitation
rules. 172 Relying on New York and Printz, the court concluded that
CERCLA’s claim-accrual provision
does not conscript into federal service either the state’s legislature or
its executive branch. Rather, . . . [it] simply requires courts in which
state-law toxic tort claims are asserted to recognize that such a claim
did not accrue before the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known the cause of the injury. This is a modest requirement that is
squarely within Congress’s long established powers under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.173
Thus, the court appeared to espouse a new rule that Congress may impose

was based largely on an examination of the “dichotomy between substance and procedure” presented
by Supreme Court decisions over time. Id. As discussed in Section IV(E) below, the Supreme Court
later cited Professor Bellia’s article in Jinks. 538 U.S. at 464.
168. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Karen S. Nabholz, The Tick of the Statute of Limitations Clock: How the FRCD Preempts the State Law Accrual
Date in Freier v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 63 (2004) (“The Second
Circuit correctly interpreted the FRCD.”).
169. See infra Sections IV.C.1–4.
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2012).
171. See id. § 9658 (discussing state statutes of limitations).
172. Freier, 303 F.3d at 183.
173. Id. at 204.
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“modest” procedural requirements on state courts adjudicating state law
claims in the absence of any federally created and preemptive substantive
rights.174 In the immediately preceding section of its decision, however, the
court specifically found that the claim-accrual provision was not purely procedural, but was an important part of the overall regulatory scheme that enables plaintiffs to vindicate their substantive rights. 175
Congress enacted CERCLA as a “comprehensive response to the national
problem of controlling and remediating the effects of release of dangerous
contaminants.” 176 CERCLA creates a number of substantive federal rights
and causes of action. 177 Among other things, CERCLA “authorizes a national
plan establishing procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances.” 178 As part of the national plan, Congress determined that
“uniformity in achieving redress in state courts for toxic torts,” including for
state law claims arising out of “wholly intrastate releases of hazardous
wastes,” was necessary to regulate interstate commerce so as to prevent “competitive imbalances in the hazardous wastes disposal industry based on differing schemes for invoking relevant statutes of repose.” 179 Congress thus included the claim-accrual provision to apply to CERCLA claims as well as to
all state toxic tort claims. 180
In rejecting the contention that CERCLA’s claim-accrual provision exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, the court in Freier found that
the provision “is an integral part of the regulatory scheme established by
CERCLA.” 181 Specifically, the court found that the provision induces voluntary remediation by polluters by exposing them “to a longer period of liability
for the harms [their] sites cause to human health and the environment,”
whereas shorter state limitations periods incentivized polluters to gamble that
174. Id.
175. Id. at 203 (“In sum, we conclude that the FRCD is an integral part of the regulatory scheme
established by CERCLA, furthering CERCLA’s goals in various ways . . . .”).
176. Id. at 186 (quoting In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 26 F. Supp. 2d 512, 543 (W.D.N.Y. 1998),
vacated sub nom. Frier, 303 F.3d at 176).
177. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (imposing liability for environmental remediation).
178. Freier, 303 F.3d at 201 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)).
179. Id. at 186 (quoting In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 26 F. Supp. 2d at 543).
180. Id. at 203 (“Clearly, CERCLA itself was enacted as a response to a national problem . . . .”).
181. Id.
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victims’ claims would be time-barred because they would be unaware of any
harm caused. 182 The claim-accrual provision thus furthered the national plan
that Congress had created under its Commerce Clause powers.183
Accordingly, Freier is in line with the holdings in Dice and Felder which
permit preemption by federal procedural rules when they are “part and parcel” 184 of substantive federal rights and causes of action. 185
1. Burnett
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in Burnett v. Grattan. 186 In
Burnett, the Supreme Court considered how to apply the Civil Rights Act’s
statute of limitations “borrowing” provision,187 and whether Maryland’s statute of limitations governing administrative claims for employment discrimination was an appropriate period to apply to federal Civil Rights Act claims
asserted in Maryland federal courts. 188 The Court held that Maryland’s administrative limitations period was unduly short to vindicate federal civil
rights.189
The Court in Burnett began by explaining that, “[i]n the Civil Rights Act,
Congress established causes of action arising out of rights and duties under
the Constitution and federal statutes.” 190 The Court found that “[a]n appropriate limitations period must be responsive to” the federal rights that

182. Id.
183. Id. (“CERCLA . . . was within Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.”).
184. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 368 (1952)
185. See Freier, 303 F.3d at 204; Dice, 342 U.S. at363 (1952). The Justice Department’s 1989
opinion discussed above includes a parting and non-elucidated footnote observing that Congress has
preempted certain state statutes of limitations in the toxic tort context under CERCLA. Congressional
Authority, supra note 96, at 376 n.5. Again, because CERCLA is not a purely procedural preemptive
statute, the Department’s reliance on the claim-accrual provision of CERCLA was misplaced. See
supra notes 175–85 and accompanying text.
186. 468 U.S. 42, 45 (1984), partially overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261 (1985), and Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
187. Id. at 55.
188. Id. at 143–46.
189. Id. at 54–55.
190. Id. at 50.
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Congress created.191 The Court also found that, whereas “[l]itigating a civil
rights claim requires considerable preparation,” the goal of Maryland’s administrative procedure was to facilitate “the prompt identification and resolution of employment disputes” and to “encourage[] conciliation and private
settlement . . . in live disputes.”192 The Court concluded that Maryland’s
“short statute of limitations” for administrative claims, which was not “devise[d] . . . with national interests in mind” and had different “policy goals,”
was incongruous with “the implementation of national policies” that Congress
created through the Civil Rights Act.193
Thus, when Congress creates federal rights and causes of action that are
supreme over the states, Congress likewise may dictate the procedures to vindicate those rights and causes of action. 194 States may not rely on conflicting
civil procedural rules that could detract from the federal right itself. 195 The
Supreme Court has not held, however, that Congress can procedurally
preempt state causes of action without an appurtenant federal substantive right
and remedy. 196
The Freier panel contrarily found that “Congress may, as it has done on
occasion, simply extend a state limitations period,” regardless of whether
Congress also creates substantive federal rights and remedies. 197 For that
proposition, the court cited Stewart v. Kahn.198 Nevertheless, Stewart is another decision that is akin to the “part and parcel” rule. 199
2. Stewart
The issue in Stewart was whether Congress had the power to toll state
191. Id.
192. Id. at 50, 54.
193. Id. at 52–54 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)).
194. See id. at 54–55 (“[We] conclude that borrowing the limitations period from Maryland[ ]. . .
was inappropriate.”).
195. See id.
196. Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has
twice noted the issue but declined to decide it.”).
197. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 204 (2d Cir. 2002).
198. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 497 (1870).
199. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 368 (1952) (using the part and
parcel rule); see Stewart, 78 U.S. at 507.

54

[Vol. 2018: 19]

The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

statutes of limitations for claims against those who were in the Confederacy
during the Civil War and thus unable to be served with process. 200 The Court
held that Congress had such a right but not as an exercise of purely procedural
preemption. 201 Rather, the Court explained that such tolling was necessary to
vindicate Congress’s substantive power “to declare war.” 202 The Court explained that Congress’s war power:
[C]arries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate
renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen
from its rise and progress. This [tolling statute] falls within the latter
category. The power to pass it is necessarily implied from the powers
to make war and suppress insurrections. It is a beneficent exercise
of this authority. . . . It would be a strange result if those in rebellion,
by protracting the conflict, could thus rid themselves of their debts,
and Congress, which had the power to wage war and suppress the
insurrection, had no power to remedy such an evil, which is one of
its consequences. 203
Thus, because Congress had exercised its substantive power by actually
declaring war against the Confederacy, Congress “necessarily” had the concomitant right to impose procedural rules on the states to vindicate Congress’s
power and decision to have waged war. 204
3. Woods
The Supreme Court’s decision in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. is also
instructive.205 Woods involved Congress’s power under the Necessary and

200. Stewart, 78 U.S. at 501–02.
201. See id. at 506–07.
202. Id. at 506.
203. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
204. Id.; accord Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 3936(a) (2012). The
act was transferred from 50 U.S.C. § 525 to § 3935. 50 App. U.S.C.A. (West 2018); see Freier v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 204 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing § 525 and describing it as “tolling
limitations periods for actions by or against persons in active military service”).
205. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).

55

[Vol. 2018: 19]

The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Proper Clause of Article I, 206 to regulate housing rents (due to a perceived
shortage of available housing at the time) as an incident to its war power after
the conclusion of World War II. 207 The Court found “that the war power sustains this legislation” because it “includes the power ‘to remedy the evils
which have arisen from its rise and progress’ and continues for the duration
of that emergency.” 208 The Court went on to state that, “[w]hatever may be
the consequences when war is officially terminated, the war power does not
necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities.” 209
The Court in Woods also noted, however, that tension with the Tenth
Amendment could arise were Congress to over-rely on its war power. 210 The
Court explained:
We recognize the force of the argument that the effects of war under
modern conditions may be felt in the economy for years and years,
and that if the war power can be used in days of peace to treat all the
wounds which war inflicts on our society, it may not only swallow up
all other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments as well. There are no such implications in today’s
decision. We deal here with the consequences of a housing deficit
greatly intensified during the period of hostilities by the war effort.
Any power, of course, can be abused. But we cannot assume that
Congress is not alert to its constitutional responsibilities. And the
question whether the war power has been properly employed in cases
such as this is open to judicial inquiry. 211
4. Jinks
The Court applied a similar analysis in Jinks v. Richland County.212

206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
207. Woods, 333 U.S. at 139–43.
208. Id. at 141 (quoting Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161
(1919)).
209. Id. (footnote omitted).
210. Id. at 143–44.
211. Id. at 143–44 (emphasis added).
212. 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
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There, the Court examined Stewart and found that the statute of limitations
tolling rule provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute) controls supplemental state law claims asserted in federal
courts because, similar to the reasoning in Stewart, “§ 1367(d) is necessary
and proper for carrying into execution Congress’s power ‘[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court,’ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and to
assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise ‘[t]he judicial
Power of the United States,’ Art. III, § 1.” 213
The Court in Jinks reasoned that, because Congress has the substantive
power to create “inferior” courts, once Congress does so it may also create
preemptive procedural rules to give those courts effective jurisdictional power
when adjudicating state law claims. 214 The Court found that, without a tolling
rule, parties faced three “unattractive options”: they could file supplemental
state claims in federal court and risk dismissal of those claims after the limitations period had run; they could file a single state court action and forfeit
their right to a federal forum for federal claims; or they could file two concurrent actions and ask the state court to stay the action pending the outcome in
federal court.215 Each option was “obviously inefficient” and produced an
“obvious frustration of statutory policy” behind § 1367, which is to create
judicial efficiency through the federal courts.216 The Court also explained that
[t]here is no suggestion . . . that Congress enacted § 1367(d) [(the
tolling rule)] as a ‘pretext’ for ‘the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the [federal] government,’ nor is the connection between
§ 1367(d) and Congress’s authority over the federal courts so attenuated as to undermine the enumeration of powers set forth in Article I,
§ 8.217
Jinks, like Stewart and Woods, reflects the rule that if Congress creates
substantive rights and duties (such as the right to seek relief in federal courts
created by Congress, or the duty to fight a war with the right to have “evils”
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
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springing from that duty remedied thereafter), then Congress may accompany
those rights with preemptive procedural rules to ensure vindication of the substantive rights. 218
For these reasons, Freier is not compelling authority to support the proposition that Congress may preempt state causes of action by imposing purely
procedural requirements. 219 Furthermore, Freier fails to explain or reconcile
why, if Congress may preempt state causes of action on purely procedural
grounds, the Supreme Court has repeatedly gone through the exercise of analyzing whether a federal procedure is “part and parcel” 220 of an accompanying
substantive ederal right (such as in Stewart, 221 Dice,222 Felder, 223 Burnett,224
and Jinks225). 226 The Supreme Court has historically examined whether the
procedural rule is tethered to an enacted substantive federal right. 227 No such
analysis should have been necessary if Congress has carte blanche to superimpose its procedural preferences alone.228 Nor should one assume that the
Supreme Court will find its prior stare decisis rulings in this area to be

218. Id. at 461–62 (holding that Congress can toll limitations periods for state-law claims brought
in state court and referencing Stewart).
219. See supra Section IV.C..
220. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
221. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 506–07 (1870)
222. Dice, 342 U.S. at 363.
223. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 145 (1988).
224. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 54–55 (1984).
225. Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003).
226. See Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 204 (2d Cir. 2002) (deciding that the
CERCLA claim accrual provision was valid); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (“Our
question concerns only the right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal
law.”) (emphasis added).
227. See, e.g., supra notes 220–26 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]hese cases
involved federal claims being adjudicated in state court. It’s an open question whether Congress has
the power to prescribe procedural rules for state-law claims in state court.”); Congressional Authority,
supra note 96, at 373–74 (“Different questions are presented where Congress does not enact a substantive law of products liability to be applied by the states, but simply attempts to prescribe directly
the state court procedures to be followed in products liability cases arising under state law. Such an
action raises potential constitutional questions under the Tenth Amendment, since state court procedures in applying state law would appear to be an area that is generally within a state’s exclusive
control.”).
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nullities. 229
D. Partial Preemption of State Laws on Procedural Grounds Fails to
Accord with the Primary Purpose of Creating “Uniformity” Among the
States
The ultimate justification for preemption is the notion of “uniformity”
among the 50 states. 230 There is an inconsistency in the idea that Congress
may, on the one hand, accept disparate expressions of state substantive rights
and causes of action (thereby reflecting Congress’s belief that uniformity is
unnecessary), while, on the other hand, rely on the doctrine of preemption
(and its justification of “uniformity”) in superimposing only procedural rules
to regulate those disparate causes of action. 231
By not also substantively preempting state laws, Congress acquiesces to
the substantive rule-making and policy choices of the states within their local
spheres. 232 The acceptance of distinct state substantive laws undermines the
justification to require uniformity among the States, and thus undermines
Congress’s entitlement to preempt state laws. 233
E. The “Substance/Procedure” Dichotomy Traditionally Helps Define the
Boundaries for Federalism Questions
In addressing matters of federal versus state powers, the Supreme Court
has historically developed a dichotomy between “substantive” and
229. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557–58 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (“There have been few cases, however, in which the principle of stare decisis and the
rationale of recent decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness.”).
230. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 186 (2d Cir. 2002).
231. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (preemption is based on
“concern for uniformity”) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25
(1964); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361–62 (1952).
232. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purposes of Congress.”).
233. See also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6. (2000) (“[F]ield preemption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption.”). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a
matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its
purpose and intended effects.” Id. at 373.
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“procedural” laws. 234
The substance/procedure dichotomy should be viewed as similarly effective at demarking federal and state powers in the context of Tenth Amendment
disputes: procedural rules governing state law claims should be deemed reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment and not susceptible to Supremacy Clause preemption. 235
The Supreme Court offered some analogous consideration of this issue
regarding statutes of limitations rules in Jinks, where the Court found “that
Congress may not, consistent with the Constitution, prescribe procedural rules
for state courts’ adjudication of purely state-law claims.” 236 The Court explained that, “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that a principled dichotomy
can be drawn, for purposes of determining whether an Act of Congress is
‘proper,’ between federal laws that regulate state-court ‘procedure’ [for purposes of federal court jurisdictional analysis] and laws that change the ‘substance’ of state-law rights of action, we do not think that state-law limitations
periods fall into the category of ‘procedure’ immune from congressional regulation.” 237
For these reasons, the Tenth Amendment should operate to prohibit Congress from only partially preempting state causes of action with purely procedural federal rules.238 Congress should be permitted to preempt state procedural rules only when Congress’s rules are part and parcel of substantive
federal rights and causes of action that Congress has also created. 239
234. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (finding in context of federal court jurisdictional dispute that statutes of limitations are substantive in nature); see Jinks v. Richland County,
538 U.S. 456, 464–65 (2003); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1988) (finding in
context of Full Faith and Credit Clause dispute that “[t]he historical record shows conclusively, we
think, that the society which adopted the Constitution did not regard statutes of limitations as substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts, but rather as procedural
restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts”). Erie, Jinks, and Sun Oil are discussed
further in Part V.
235. See infra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
236. 538 U.S. at 464.
237. Id. at 464-65 (first citing Bellia, supra note 119, at 970–1001 (relying on substance/procedure
analysis in concluding that “‘procedural law’ derives exclusively from state authority” for Tenth
Amendment purposes); and then citing Congressional Authority, supra note 96, at 373–74).
238. See supra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 651 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen Congress
creates a cause of action over which the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the state courts are
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V. IMPACT ON THE HEAR ACT
The HEAR Act creates no federal cause of action and articulates no substantive federal rights and remedies. 240 Nor does the HEAR Act purport to
base its authority on any provision of Article I, § 8 (such as the Commerce
Clause or the War Powers Clause). 241 Rather, the HEAR Act purports only to
provide a preemptive statute of limitations period for all state law claims of
general applicability when those claims are asserted in the context of the determination of rights in Holocaust-era artworks. 242 Therefore, the HEAR Act
should be viewed as a purely procedural proposed statute which, as explained
above, would violate the Tenth Amendment. 243
A. The HEAR Act Provides No Substantive Federal Cause of Action
There is no individual right of action inherent in the HEAR Act: the statute specifically provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to create
a civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.” 244 In Orkin v.
Taylor, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that the 1998 HVRA “did not create
a private right of action against private art owners.” 245 The HVRA provides
in relevant part:
It is the sense of the Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague
Convention, all governments should undertake good faith efforts to
facilitate the return of private and public property, such as works of
art, to the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from
the claimant during the period of Nazi rule and there is reasonable
proof that the claimant is the rightful owner. 246

bound by the Supremacy Clause to adjudicate the claim.”).
240. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130
Stat. 1524(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 5.
243. See supra Section IV.E.
244. § 5(f).
245. Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2007).
246. Holocaust Victims Redress Act (HVRA) of 1998, Pub. L. 105–58, § 202, 112 Stat. 15, 17–18
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The Ninth Circuit found that this provision includes no language “that can
fairly be characterized as mandatory” and, moreover, creates no “enforceable
law.” 247 As the court explained: “There is simply no ‘right- or duty-creating
language’ anywhere in the statutory scheme, and [the statute’s] announcement
of a ‘sense of the Congress’ cannot, of its own force, imply a private right of
action.”248
The HEAR Act’s only mandatory language concerns its imposition of a
six-year statute of limitations (based upon an “actual discovery” rule) for “a
civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any artwork or
other property that was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution.”249
Nevertheless, there is no “right- or duty-creating language” in the HEAR
Act that actually constitutes a new preemptive federal civil claim or cause of
action against a defendant; instead, the statute relies on existing state laws of
general applicability to provide the necessary substantive elements and remedies.250
Likewise, the substantive policies that the HEAR Act seeks to “further”—
meaning those “set forth” in the Washington Conference Principles, the

(1998).
247. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 739.
248. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979);
and then quoting Yang v. Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)) ; accord Dunbar
v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 577 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Here, no Act of Congress has articulated
‘rights and obligations of the United States’ in regard to these claims; even the HVRA creates no
individual cause of action. . . . Further, no interstate or international disputes are implicated in this
controversy that require creation of a uniform federal rule of law.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Orkin,
487 F.3d at 739).
249. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016 § 5(a).
250. See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576–77 (“No court has ever adopted what Appellant is urging here—
some form of special federal limitations period governing all claims involving Nazi-confiscated artwork [in furtherance of the policy underpinning the Terezin Declaration]. In such cases, courts have
consistently applied state statutes of limitations.”); Orkin, 487 F.3d at 740–41 (“[T]here can be no
doubt . . . that state law provides causes of action for restitution of stolen artworks. Furthermore, the
torts asserted here are undoubtedly causes of action that are traditionally relegated to state law. Implication of a federal remedy in this case, therefore, would be inappropriate . . . . Congress did not
intend to supersede traditional state-law remedies when it passed the Act. . . . Given the absence of
congressional intent to create a private right of action, the [plaintiffs’] assertion of a federal right of
action must fail.”) (citation omitted).
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HVRA, and the Terezin Declaration—are all legally “non-binding” and nonenforceable.251 Accordingly, the HEAR Act creates no enforceable, substantive federal rights or remedies.252
B. The HEAR Act Would Not Provide Federal Question Jurisdiction
The HEAR Act also should not be understood to create federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 253 “[T]he absence of a federal private
right of action [is] evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive
judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.” 254 In “certain
cases federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate
significant federal issues . . . turn[ing] on substantial questions of federal law,
[which] thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” 255
The Grable Court’s discussion of the decision in Merrell Dow

251. § 3(1); see Orkin, 487 F.3d at 741– 42; see also Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576–77.
252. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 739–40 (noting that HVRA “do not in themselves create individual rights
or, for that matter, any enforceable law.”). The HEAR Act applies to works of art “lost” during the
Holocaust era, where the term “lost” is undefined by the statute. See § 5(a). State law should govern
the substantive question of whether a “voluntary” sale during the Holocaust era did or did not occur;
and, furthermore, whether a voluntary sale may or may not be actionable and subject to rescission or
restitution. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring)
(“‘Under American law and the law of many foreign states there is only one scenario in which a goodfaith purchaser’s claim of title is immediately recognized over that of the original owner. This scenario
arises when the owner voluntarily parts with possession by the creation of a bailment, the bailee converts the chattel, and the nature of the bailment allows a reasonable buyer to conclude that the bailee
is empowered to pass the owner’s title.’ Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of
Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J.
955, 971 (2001) (emphasis added). The principle to which Professor Reyhan alludes is codified in
more limited form in section 2-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which was adopted by New
York, and which provides that ‘[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him the power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.’”). The HEAR Act does not purport to preempt the various state enactments of
the Uniform Commercial Code in this or any other regard.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
254. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005) (quoting
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)).
255. Id. at 312 (citation omitted).
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Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Thompson 256 is instructive:
The absence of any federal cause of action affected Merrell Dow’s
result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth some consideration
in the assessment of substantiality. But its primary importance
emerged when the Court treated the combination of no federal cause
of action and no preemption of state remedies for misbranding as an
important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction
to be exercised under § 1331. The Court saw the missing cause of
action not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a
missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances, when exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would have
attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other
state claims with embedded federal issues. For if the federal labeling
standard without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into
federal court, so could any other federal standard without a federal
cause of action. And that would have meant a tremendous number of
cases.
. . . In this situation, no welcome mat meant keep out. 257
There are no “significant federal issues” or “substantial questions of federal law” raised by the HEAR Act. 258 The HEAR Act relies on aspirational
but non-binding principles, embraces state causes of action and all of their
various substantive provisions and elements of proof, and imposes a federal
limitations period for claims brought during the next ten years. 259 Given the
absence of substantive federal issues that could require resolution, the HEAR
Act should not be viewed as opening the doors of the federal courts to
“horde[s]” of state law claims under § 1331. 260
256. Thompson, 478 U.S. at 804.
257. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318–19 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 312.
259. See Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, §§ 1–5
130 Stat. 1524,1524–27 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)).
260. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 318 (“The Court saw the missing cause of action not as a missing
federal door key, always required, but as a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances, when
exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would have attracted a horde of original
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C. The Federal Statute of Limitations Proposed by The HEAR Act Is Purely
Procedural in Nature, Not Substantive
As discussed above, purely procedural preemption should be barred by
the Tenth Amendment. 261 “To what extent rules of practice and procedure
may themselves dig into ‘substantive rights’ is a troublesome question at
best.” 262 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has developed a dichotomy in its
jurisprudence that recognizes statutes of limitations as substantive when
viewed in the context of questions concerning federal court jurisdiction, and
as procedural when viewed in the context of questions concerning conflicts of
laws. 263
The ability to obtain federal jurisdiction over state court claims raises the
primary policy concern of forum-shopping. 264 For example, “[t]he nub of the
policy that underlies Erie . . . is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.” 265 A federal
court sitting in diversity should be like another state court; a fundamentally
different substantive outcome should not result in a federal court because of
its particular procedural rules. 266 Accordingly, when viewed in the context of
determining diversity jurisdiction questions, state statutes of limitations are
viewed as substantive and must be applied by the federal courts to better ensure uniform outcomes. 267 The same analysis applies to cases involving
filings and removal cases raising other state claims with embedded federal issues.”).
261. See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
262. Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949); accord Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945) (“And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
‘procedure’ in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory
limitation is a matter of substance . . . namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for
a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim
by the same parties in a State court?”).
263. See supra Section IV.E.
264. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 87, 95–96 (2009) (“Attempts by domestic litigants to shop vertically in the post-Erie
environment . . . have met with overt hostility from the federal judiciary.”).
265. York, 326 U.S. at 109.
266. Id.
267. Id.; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Congress has no power to declare
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federal supplemental jurisdiction and the concomitant tolling of limitations
periods
over
state
law
claims
pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§ 1367(d).268
In contrast, in cases involving Full Faith and Credit Clause questions, the
Court has found that statutes of limitations are procedural. 269 In Sun Oil, the
Court reiterated that, “[e]xcept at the extremes, the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean
in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the
dichotomy is drawn.”270 The Court explained that, “[i]n the context of our
Erie jurisprudence, that purpose is to establish . . . substantial uniformity of
predictable outcome between cases tried in a federal court and cases tried in
the courts of the State in which the federal court sits.” 271 The Court then further explained: “The purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the
context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, by contrast, is not to establish
uniformity but to delimit spheres of state legislative competence.”272
As in cases concerning the Full Faith and Credit Clause, cases concerning
tension between the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause raise
“spheres of . . . legislative competence” and conflict of laws issues—as between federal and state legal preferences and regimes. 273 Viewed in that context, statutes of limitations are “procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts.”274
Furthermore, the HEAR Act identifies statute of limitations defenses as

substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’
be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”).
268. Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464–65 (2003) (relying on Erie and York as
“provid[ing] ample support for the proposition that—if the substance-procedure dichotomy posited by
respondent is valid—the tolling of limitations periods falls on the ‘substantive’ side of the line.”).
269. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1988).
270. Id. at 726.
271. Id. at 726–27 (citations omitted).
272. Id. at 727 (emphasis added); accord Jinks, 538 U.S. at 465 (reconciling holding that statutes
of limitations are substantive for federal court jurisdictional issues with Sun Oil’s holding that statutes
of limitations are procedural for Full Faith and Credit issues).
273. See Seth P. Waxman, Federalism, Law Enforcement, and the Supremacy Clause: The Strange
Case of Ruby Ridge, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 141, 142–43 (2002) (discussing the relationship between the
Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment to delineate federal and state powers).
274. Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726.
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“procedural obstacles,” not as substantive rights. 275 The HEAR Act’s own
characterization of statutes of limitations as procedural defenses, and not as
substantive rights of defendants, should be confirmed by the courts, and the
Act’s purely procedural preemption—as to limitations defenses only—should
be held unconstitutional. 276
VI. CONCLUSION
The HEAR Act only procedurally preempts state laws of general applicability in the context of Holocaust-era art restitution, without creating any substantive and binding federal rights or causes of action. 277 Thus, the HEAR Act
constitutes a novel attempt to expand Congress’s power. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule whether Congress can engage in purely procedural
preemption, its existing precedents and the policies underlying federalism
support the conclusion that the HEAR Act should be invalidated under the
Tenth Amendment. 278

275. Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2(6) 130
Stat. 1524,1524–27 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016)).
276. See id.
277. See supra Section V.C.
278. See, e.g., supra note 201. Congress could try to enact a federal law that substantively preempts
all state law claims in this particular area, with a concomitant statute of limitations, in a more traditional display of federal preemption. Nevertheless, Congress has not done so with the HEAR Act.
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